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 3 
Introduction 
 The Palestinian/Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli conflict are defining 
confrontations of our time. Countries and people around the globe have a hard time 
staying out of the debate over who is the legal owner of a very small parcel of land. The 
current territory includes the State of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories-the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. According to the CIA World 
Factbook, Israel is 1,068 kilometers (slightly larger than New Jersey), the West Bank is 
5,860 square kilometers (slightly smaller than Delaware) and the Gaza Strip is 360 square 
kilometers (slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC (CIA World Factbook 
Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip). Many claims exist for this land, ranging from 
nationalistic in origin to religious. Currently, Israelis and Palestinians both hold 
assertions of ownership over Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Within the 
ownership claims, there are supposed entitlements based on nationalistic and religious 
arguments for both sides with varying levels of strength and use for each. The nationalist 
claim has historically been the strongest for both sides, with the Zionists and Palestinian 
nationalists.  
 The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is messy, with no clear-cut solution and with all 
peace negotiations failing. An aspect constantly debated is the degree of support for the 
peace conferences, from Palestinians, Israelis, and other actors in the discussions. 
Significant research has been conducted examining the factors that influence Palestinian 
public opinion regarding the possibility of peace with Israel. Scholars have examined 
how gender, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, support for violence, and many 
other elements could influence popular opinion for the peace process (Adler 1998; 
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Genicot and Skaperdas 2002; Shaliyeh and Deng 2003; Tessler and Warriner, 1997; 
Tessler et al, 1999; Shikaki 2002; Flanigan and O’brien 2015). Some scholarship looks at 
changes in Palestinian support for the peace process, but it has never been a major focus 
compared to the determinants of public opinion (Shikaki 2006). Nor has it examined data 
since the early 2000s.  
         While these themes have been examined before, what is missing from research is 
current data. Most published articles on the topic of Palestinian public opinion stop 
around 2006, meaning that information gathered after the Gaza War in the summer of 
2014 and other major events have not been analyzed in an academic setting. There are 
small reports on the data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, but 
they give rudimentary facts about the figures, comparing responses between gender, age, 
political affiliation, education level and so on. All of these findings are more descriptive 
in nature rather than quantitative. There is also the possibility this new data has been 
utilized in articles written in Arabic or Hebrew and not translated, meaning that the 
information gathered is not accessible to the wider academic community. 
         The focus of my research will be on the question of Palestinian public opinion with 
respect to the peace process. I will ask the following: Did Palestinian support for peace 
fluctuate from 2006 to 2012 and if so, why? This paper aims not only to look at whether 
or not Palestinian support for the Middle East peace process has changed over a six-year 
period, but also to examine some of the possible factors that could be influencing the 
change in popular opinions towards peace. A binomial logistic regression will be run on 
survey data from the Arab Barometer (AB) and the Palestinian Center for Policy and 
Survey Research (PCPRS) to determine whether Palestinian support for the peace process 
 5 
has changed from 2006 to 2012.  
 The literature review will include a discussion of some determinates of public 
opinion, including gender, political affiliation, religiosity, economic status, and area of 
residence. There are many more determinants that have been studied, but for the purpose 
of this research and for continuity in question wording, these five determinants have been 
chosen. Since this thesis is using survey data from two different sources in a six year time 
period, I had to be selective in respects to continuity in question wording and to make 
sure the independent and dependent questions were not too similar to the point where it 
would disrupt the binomial logistic regression analysis.  
Historic Background 
 Zionism was/is the movement to bring Jews to Palestine and was founded in the 
nineteenth century by Theodor Herzl. It is a secular movement that took parts of Jewish 
history and scripture to support their claim of ownership over Ottoman Palestine. The 
Zionist claim to the land is based in the nationalist reasoning that the Jews needed a place 
away from the anti-Semitism of Europe. Ottoman Palestine was selected for the Jewish 
people’s conntection to the land and its history. The religious claim for chosing Palestine 
comes from Abraham’s covenant with God, which proclaimed that his descendants would 
have control over and live in Cannaan (Genesis 17:2-10 [JPS]). The link to antiquity 
informs Jewish history with stories celebrating the reigns of David and Solomon over the 
Kingdom of Israel and also the destruction of the second Temple. Zionists viewed this 
legacy as direct, negating the 2,000 or so years that is termed the “exile” period of Jewish 
history (Zerubavel 17, 25). The claim of Palestine specifically as a refuge was a large part 
of Revisionist Zionism, created in the early twentieth century by Vladimir Jabotinsky, 
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who stated that “[w]e have got to save millions, many millions. I do not know; but it is a 
question of re-housing one-third of the Jewish race, half of the Jewish race, or a quarter 
of the Jewish race; I do not know; but it is a question of millions” (Gettleman and Schaar 
2005, 175). All of these reasonings have driven the Yishuv and then Israeli need for a 
Jewish state. 
         The Palestinian/Muslim claim has some similarities to the Jewish entitlements for 
the land. The Palestinians claim that their families have been living in this area for 
centuries (Smith 2012, 9). There is also the notion of the right to self-determination, 
which was a popular after World War 1 and became a part of the decolonization 
movement post World War II. The right to self-determination is the idea that all people 
have a right to their own nation within a cohesive group based on some commonality, 
generally culture or language (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica). This was seen 
by the Palestinians after the Second World War to better than being under the rule of the 
British through the mandate system. It is rare for Palestinian nationalists to bring up a 
religious entitlement in the argument, but when they do, they mention that Muslims are 
descendants of Abraham/Ibrahim through Ishmael. The Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem is 
also incredibly important because it is where the Prophet Muhammad went on his night 
journey to heaven (Smith 2012, 1). The nationalistic and religious claims have motivated 
Palestinian nationalists to keep working towards an independent Palestine. 
 The nationalist and religious convictions have empowered Jews and Muslims to 
fight for what they consider their rightful territory. Small skirmishes between the sides 
occurred before the end of World War II, but they became greater in size after the 
partition in 1947. The battles change in scale and in players, but the root cause did not, 
 7 
Jews and Palestinians each wanted to make good on their claims of rightful ownership of 
the territory (Smith 2012, 193-194).          
         The wars fought over this land in the last century have changed the political arena 
as well as the political geography of the Middle East. The war that made the most impact, 
geographically speaking, is the Six Day War, also known as the 1967 War. Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria were participants in this military confrontation (Smith 2012, 284). In 
the course of seven days, Israel gained control over the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, 
the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (Smith 2012, 286). This 
geographic gain created the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). The swift defeat of the 
involved Arab nations proved to the Palestinians that they were going to have to fight for 
themselves and not let anyone else fight their battle for a Palestinian state (Gelvin 2014, 
201). This changed the conflict from exclusively being an Arab-Israeli conflict to an 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before the Six-Day War: Gaza and the Sinai were controlled 
by Egypt, Jordan governed East Jerusalem as well as the rest of West Bank and the Golan 
Heights was under the control of Syria. The tensions over land acquisition in 1967, 
checkpoints, control of Jerusalem, Right of Return, operational power over water and 
many other aspects stemming from this land acquisition have continued to the present 
day.  
 The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is the most well known 
organization that claims to speak for the Palestinian people, in the camps, Israel, other 
Arab nations, and ones in the diaspora. It was created in Egypt in 1964 under the 
direction of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser to curb the flow and strength of Palestinian 
guerilla fighters and would “mollify and rein in [Palestinian] interests” to suit his needs 
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(Gelvin 2014, 200).  
 Not all hope for peace was lost after the 1967 War. The first peace treaty that 
Israeli was a part of was Camp David I. Camp David I was signed on September 17, 1978 
involved President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel 
with President Carter acting as witness. This accord ended the state of war between Israel 
and Egypt and gave the Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt. The only time Palestinians were 
mentioned in the accord was to solve the “Palestinian problem”. This was to occur 
through a “propose[l] to grant autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and to install a local administration for a five-year interim period, after which 
the final status of the territories would be negotiated” (Primer on Palestine…). For the 
Arab nations around Egypt and Israel, Sadat was seen as a traitor and Egypt was 
dismissed from the Arab League (Gelvin 2012, 216).  
 The First Intifada, translated to “shaking off” occurred from 1987-1993. One of 
the crucial things to remember is that the PLO was not initially involved in this action 
(Primer on Palestine…). This movement was started by the Palestinians actually living in 
the oPt and used forms of civil disobedience as well as slight use of force. The 
Palestinians in the occupied territories did not want to live under the control of Israel any 
longer. The civil disobedience resembled other similar actions around the world, from 
large protests to boycotting Israeli products. People also created underground schools 
since the military closed them “as reprisals for the uprising” (Primer on Palestine…). The 
uses of force included throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails to creating roadblocks 
(Primer on Palestine...).   
 Oslo I, officially referred to as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
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Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP), was an accord officially 
signed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Yasser Arafat representing the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people in 1993. This was the first 
time that Israel and the PLO recognized each other. The DOP created the Palestinian 
National Authority (PA) and called for the extraction of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
from sections of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Laqueur and Rubin 2008, 414 and 
415). The accord also created a plan for peace between Israel and Palestine “leading to a 
permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 after five 
years” (Laqueur and Rubin 2008, 413).  
 Oslo II was an accord signed in 1995 that created three zones of influence in the 
West Bank. Zones A and B were areas where the PA would have some influence and 
obligations. Zone C were areas that Israel would still have complete control over until 
agreement was reached over the permanent status issues such as Jerusalem and 
settlements (Gelvin 2012, 238). The IDF was to pull out of areas A and B and turn it over 
to the minimal control of the PA. One of the problems with this arrangement is that “over 
approximately 70 percent of the West Bank” was under Zone C (Gelvin 2012, 238).  
 Camp David II was a summit in 2000 started by President Bill Clinton to have 
Chairman Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel sign an accord to end 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The summit ended without an agreement between the 
parties. The problem can be summed up quite well with the following two sentences. 
“Each side held basic preconceptions unintelligible to the other. Israelis expected 
Palestinians to be grateful to their offer to withdraw from up to 90 percent of the West 
Bank. Palestinians saw this as insulting” (Smith 2012, 492). After the failed summit, a 
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huge changed occurred in the peace process, the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  
 The Al-Aqsa Intifada, also known as the Second Intifada, lasted from 2000 to 
2005. It began after Ariel Sharon went to the Temple Mount with armed guards. Some 
saw this action as a possible change in the status quo over who controlled the Temple 
Mount. This intifada was far more violent than the first in 1987.  
         Today, life in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is generally poor. The 
checkpoints scattered throughout Palestine, especially in the West Bank, impede daily 
life. These barriers mean that people have an incredibly hard time getting to school, 
work, medical centers, and even family because they go right through preexisting 
neighborhoods and villages. David Shearer states that from 2005 to 2006, the number of 
checkpoints and other obstructions has increased from 376 to 535 (Shearer 2006). 
Shearer also reports that before the Al-Aqsa Intifada, “more than 150,000 Palestinians 
worked in Israel. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, also known as the Second Intifada, took place 
from 2000 to 2005. Nearly 90% of those people have now lost their jobs” (Shearer 2006). 
When this many people are out of work, it creates unrest in the community and starts to 
breed resentment in the population. By 2006, “approximately 430,000 settlers” were 
living in the West Bank and with the growth in the settler population came more 
checkpoints and restrictions on Palestinians (Shearer 2006). 
Literature Review 
Gender 
 One of the more contested determinates of influence is the effect of gender. On 
one side of the argument, arguably a small segment of the field, scholars say that gender 
does not play a significant part in someone’s support for peace. This statement goes 
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against many other articles on the subject of women and peace as well as the women and 
peace hypothesis. “The ‘women and peace’ hypothesis proposes that women have 
tendency to hold more peaceful and compromising attitudes than men” (Maoz 2009, 
520). A case study done by Shaliyeh and Deng discovered “that Palestinian women are 
on average 85 percent more likely to support peace with Israel more than men” (Shaliyeh 
and Deng 2003, 705). This finding is the one that most studies suggest. There is also 
support for the idea that “increased gender equality, resulting in women’s equal political, 
economic, and social power, will result in more pacific foreign policy behavior” (Caprioli 
2000, 53). Interstingly, this is one place where Dr. Mark Tessler views gender can have 
an indirect effect on general support for peace.  
 Mark Tessler, a professor of political science, is a major scholar who supports the 
idea of there being no difference in level of support for peace between men and women in 
the MENA region using survey data from multiple countries. Dr. Tessler has written two 
studies that examine whether gender has an impact on support for peace. Both studies 
conclude saying that gender is not a major element in public opinion for peace (Tessler 
and Warriner, 1997; Tessler et al, 1999). In the first article, Tessler says the data posits, 
“that women are not more pacific than men in their attitudes toward international 
conflict” (Tessler and Warriner 1997, 280). One interesting finding from this study is that 
the people who support equality between men and women had a higher probability of 
standing by diplomacy as a way to end clashes (Tessler and Warriner 1997, 280). The 
follow up study Tessler completed in 1999 reiterated his earlier test and its subsequent 
conclusions, “[t]he consistent finding of no relationship provides compelling evidence 
that the women and peace hypothesis does not apply to the Middle East, or at least not in 
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the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Tessler and Nachtwey 1999, 528). The data poll 
includes Israelis, Egyptians, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Lebanese, and Palestinians, so there is 
a representative sample of many Middle Eastern countries (Tessler and Nachtwey 1999, 
524-525). Proponents of this view are not as common as those who believe that women 
are more inclined towards peace than men.  
Political Affiliation 
 There is a general consensus that political affiliation effects a person’s position on 
a certain issue pertaining to their political party (Jacoby 644). In the case of Palestinian 
political parties, there are two dominant platforms and parties, Fatah, currently headed by 
Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas, currently ruled by Khaled Meshaal. By knowing only the 
basics of the two parties, one would assume that Palestinians who support Fatah would be 
more supportive of the peace process with Israel and adherents of Hamas would not 
support peace with Israel. This assumption appears to be correct, in 1994; Mkhaimer 
Abusada found that “ [s]upport for the negotiations is overwhelming among supporters of 
Fatah, Fida, and PPP. Among supporters of the Islamic and leftist groups, the majority 
either oppose or have decreased their support for the peace process” (Abusada 1998, 5). 
In relation to this quote it is important to remember that this is from a year after the first 
Oslo Accord signed in Washington D.C., so many Palestinians were feeling optimistic 
about the future of the negotiations and hoped for swift outcomes for the everyday 
people. Abusada posits that the reason supporters of Hamas did not support the peace 
process at that time was because they “might not have felt any positive results” from the 
negotiations (Abusada 1998, 6).   
 Support for Hamas is another factor that can influence Palestinian popular 
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opinion. Hamas’ charter states that they do not want the Jewish State of Israel to exist, 
which means by extension they are not willing to support any type of peace process. One 
would expect believing in Hamas’ charter and voting for them in elections means not 
supporting peace negotiations with Israel, at least fully. Shaliyeh and Deng found that 
Palestinians who sympathize with Hamas are unlikely to back peace with Israel (Shaliyeh 
and Deng 2003, 704). Flanigan and O’brien studied the effects that people going to 
Hamas and Fatah for help on matters such as infrastructure, dispute, family illness and 
reporting crime had on opinions on the peace process. Flanigan and O’brien found that 
out of the people who go to Hamas for help, from a total of 1,012 people interviewed, 
about 28 percent said their ideal resolution for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was “total 
destruction of Israel” compared to around 15 percent of people who would go to Fatah 
(Flanigan and O’brien 2015, 637).   
Religiosity  
 Religiosity is another determinate that can influence people’s opinion on ending 
the conflict, specifically its influence on the Palestinian opinion on peace. A broad 
assumption one can make about the impact of strong religious identification on politics is 
that it makes people more conservative compared to their secular, agnostic, or atheist 
compatriots. In terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, one would expect a Palestinian 
with more Islamist tendencies, bordering on the line of extreme to be not in support for 
peace with Israel. These tendencies would be along the line of Hamas, an offshoot of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. While there has not been a multiplicity of research examining the 
effect of religiosity on Palestinian support for peace, the research cannot be discredited. 
In an article written by Dr. Bernadette Hayes, a sociologist, she found that “religious 
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identification is a differential predictor of political attitudes. Second, in terms of these 
political orientations, religious affiliates and nonaffiliates do differ in expected ways” 
(Hayes 1995, 191). These findings go along with assumptions mentioned above, with the 
more religious individuals leaning more towards the conservative view on an issue and 
the nonaffiliated moving in the direction of the liberal end of the spectrum, which would 
be non support and support, respectively.  
 Dr. Tessler and Dr. Jodi Nachtwey, a political scientist, examined the impact of 
Islam on views towards conflict in “Islam and Attitudes toward International Conflict…”. 
In their analysis, Drs. Tessler and Nachtwey found that “support for political Islam 
consistently exhibits a very strong negative relationship with support for Arab-Israeli 
peace” (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998, 226). They state that there are at minimum three 
functions that have been debated on the role religion can take in influencing personal 
politics, “a priestly role, a prophetic role, and a mediating societal function” (Tessler and 
Nachtwey 1998, 214). These roles are as defined: the priestly role has religion acting as 
the driver authenticating governmental policy through morality (Tessler and Nachtwey 
1998, 214). The prophetic role has religious identity judging “governmental authority” 
and in some cases, “criticize decisions or policies deemed inconsistent with divine 
purposes” (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998, 214). The mediating societal function “offers 
protection from excessive government control and authoritarian tendencies” (Tessler and 
Nachtwey 1998, 214). The specific analysis in this article used data gathered in Palestine, 
Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon, but for the purpose of relevant survey questions, 
data from Palestine, Egypt, and Kuwait are the ones mentioned in this paper.  
Economic Status 
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 Economic status is another independent variable that it often measured for its 
impact on public opinion. A positive or negative evaluation on the current economic 
situation could have a strong impact on an individual’s support for the peace process. 
Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) posited several hypotheses on the effect of economic 
situations on the peace process. One hypothesis states that respondents who view the 
peace process and the end to the conflict as having a positive impact on the national 
and/or personal economic level have a higher chance of supporting the peace process 
(Nachtwey and Tessler 2002, 259). In support of this first hypothesis, they found that 
“individuals with a positive evaluation of the economy or of their personal situation are 
more likely to support compromise and reconciliation than are individuals with a negative 
evaluation” (Nachtwey and Tessler 2002, 269).  
 Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg use the European Union as a case study, but there 
results are interesting nonetheless. They found that “unemployment rates negatively 
influenced levels; of life satisfaction, [and] governing party support (Clarke, Dutt, and 
Kornberg 1015). While these findings do not relate directly to the question of Palestinian 
support, they can add some valuable context and depth to this particular question. For 
example, someone living in the West Bank and living under the poverty level might be 
less willing to support Fatah’s official stance on peace with Israel. On the other hand, a 
respondent residing in the Gaza Strip with a more comfortable economic status under 
Hamas might be more willing to follow the official party line.  
Area of Residence 
 Little research has been done on the impact of location on Palestinian support for 
peace. As such, these opinions are my own. For respondents living in the West Bank, one 
 16 
might assume that they would not be supportive of the peace process because they are 
living under Israeli rule and have to contend with checkpoints on a regular basis. They 
would see the Israeli government as not likely to uphold any agreement because they 
have backed out of past accords. One example is the status of Area C under the Oslo 
Accords, which stated that “[f]urther redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal 
security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in 
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 
months after the inauguration of the Council” (Other Releases… 1995). Since Israel did 
not transfer Area C over to PA control, this could be seen as a sign that Israel will not 
hold up its end of the bargain.  
Methods used by Discourse Community in Related Articles  
 This article focuses on survey data analysis, so it only makes sense to include 
some of the statistical methods employed by some of the scholars referenced in this 
thesis. In “Determinants of Palestinians’ Attitudes Toward Peace with Israel”, Sahliyeh 
and Deng utilized the ordered logit model and Wald test where applicable. Mkhaimar 
Abusada used chi-Square in his article “Palestinian party affiliation and political attitudes 
toward the peace process”. “Islam and attitudes toward international conflict: evidence 
from survey research in the Arab world” by Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey use a factor 
analysis to analyze their survey data in relation to Islam and its affect on Muslim 
individual’s opinions on international conflict.  
Methodology  
Design The survey analysis was completed using available data from the Arab Barometer 
(AB) from 2006-2012 in three waves. Data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and 
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Survey Research (PCPSR) collected in 2010 will also be analyzed. The first wave of the 
Arab Barometer data was gathered in the spring of 2006, the second wave was completed 
from December 2-5, 2010, and the third wave was collected from December 20-29, 2012. 
All three surveys were completed in partnership with the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research. Each of the polls were conducted face to face in Arabic. All of the 
PCPSR surveys were also performed face to face in Arabic. The first poll (labeled 
number #35 by the center) was taken March 4-6, 2010. The second survey (#36) was 
conducted June 10-13, 2010. The third poll (#37) used was conducted September 20-
October 2, 2010. The fourth poll (#38) completed was preformed from December 16-18, 
2010.  
Subjects The first wave of the AB had a sample size of 1,270 with all surveyed over the 
age of 18. The population size of the second AB wave was 1,200 with all over the age of 
18. The third wave of the AB had a sample of 1,200 and all polled were over the age of 
18. All four of the PCPSR surveys had a sample size of 1,270 adults. The merged data 
file has a population of 8750. 
Measurement The questions from the first AB wave used in this thesis include the 
dependent variable (view on the peace process) and the independent variables (gender of 
respondent, level of religiosity, and economic condition of their location in the occupied 
territories, whether West Bank or Gaza). The questions from the second AB wave are the 
same as above with the inclusion of which political party they would vote for in a new 
election and where they lived (West Bank or Gaza). The questions from the third AB 
wave are the same as the first wave along with which political party fit their aspirations 
the best and where they lived. The questions for all three PCPSR are the same. The 
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dependent variable asks for the respondent’s level of support for the peace process. The 
independent variables ask where they live, level of religiosity, gender, political affiliation 
and where their family sits on the poverty line.1  
Procedures The sampling methodolgy for the first AB wave was a three-stage cluster 
sampling with 120 clusters. The methodolgy for the second AB wave used stratification 
by location and clustering of households. The third AB wave’s sampling methodolgy was 
stratified by location and household clusters. The sampling methodology for all of the 
PCPSR surveys was using 127 randomly selected locations.  
This Thesis The methodology for this analysis is using binomial logistic regression by 
aid of SPSS on the survey data with questions on support for peace being the dependent 
question. Questions on gender, political affiliation, religiosity, economic status, and 
location are independent. A period was used to block missing and/or irrelevant data 
(don’t know/unsure) from being included in the analysis.  
Findings 
 The independent variables are coded as such: religious=1, not relgious=0, poor 
economic situation=1, good economic situation=0, female=1, male=0, West Bank=1, 
Gaza Strip=0, Fatah=1, Hamas=0. The dependent variable is coded as: support for peace 
with Israel=1, rejection of peace with Israel=0. The dependent variable from the Arab 
Barometer asked about the recoginition of Israel, which was the closest question to 
support for peace talks with Israel. I used a binomial logistic regression to gather the 
following results. The results table has been included at the bottom of this section. 
Year  
                                                        
1 A detailed list of all questions used can be found in the appendix. 
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 With an odds ratio of .428, we can surmise that there is a negative correlation 
between the dependent variable and an increase in years. For each one year period, the 
support for peace decreased by approximately 57 percent. In short, Palestinian support for 
peace with Israel decreased from 2006 and 2012.  
Fatah  
 The positive relationship between identifying with Fatah and the dependent 
variable is not surprising. The odds ratio of about 2.8 supports the assumption that 
supporting Fatah means that the respondent believes in many of the party’s policies, 
including talks with Israel.  
Religiosity 
  An odds ratio of 6.8 percent and a significance level of approximately 19 percent 
shows that there is a very minor positive relationship between identifying as religious and 
the dependent variable. This odds ratio and significance level supports the conclusions 
from Tessler and Nachtwey in their article “Islam and Attitudes toward International 
Conflict: Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World” in 1998. They found that 
there was no difference between people who identify as religious compared to those who 
do not in relation to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998, 226-
227). In the case of this analysis, the impact of religious identification is minimal at best.  
Economic Situation 
 The negative relationship between living under a poor economic situation and the 
dependent variable suggests that people under the poverty level are less likely to support 
peace compared to those who live above the poverty level. With an odds ratio of negative 
19.4 percent, we can say that identifying as living under a poor economic situation makes 
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an individual 19.4 percent less likely to support peace with Israel. With a significance 
level of 0 percent, these findings are statistically significant. These findings disagree with 
Sahliyeh and Deng, who found a minimal negative relationship between economic levels 
and support for peace (Sahlieyh and Deng 2003, 705). Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) 
found that “citizens who are dissatisfied with economic circumstances are less likely than 
others to support negotiation and compromise” (Nachtwey and Tessler 2002, 269). 
Overall, it can be said that living under the poverty level has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on Palestinian support for peace. 
Gender 
 There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between being female 
and higher support for peace with Israel (p<.000). This finding supports the vast majority 
of literature on the subject.  
West Bank 
 The negative relationship between living in the West Bank and the dependent 
variable is quite surprising. The odds ratio of .720 indicates that people living in the West 
Bank are approximately 28 percent less likely to support peace with Israel than people 
living in Gaza.  
  
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 econworse -.216 .056 15.108 1 .000 .806 
fatah 1.033 .055 356.592 1 .000 2.810 
female .363 .051 51.462 1 .000 1.437 
religious .066 .051 1.685 1 .194 1.068 
westbank -.329 .053 38.374 1 .000 .720 
year -.848 .039 471.196 1 .000 .428 
Constant 3.452 .174 395.524 1 .000 31.570 
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Discussion/Conclusion 
 The history of this conflict goes back only the past two centuries and is based 
primarily on political rather than religious reasoning. The early Zionists wanted a state 
where they would not be persecuted and the Palestinians demanded the right to self-
determination as was popular after WW1 and WW2. Out of the many wars and other 
violent confrontations between the State of Israel and Palestinians and/or Arab neighbors, 
the 1967 war is the one of greatest importance to this paper. This war created the borders 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as we know today. There have been accords and 
negotiations between representatives of the Palestinian people and the Israeli 
government; which have never come to complete fruition for a multitude of reasons.  
 Overall, Palestinian support for peace with Israel has decreased from 2006-2012. 
There are many possible reasons for this, while disheartening, not surprising decrease in 
support. All of the independent variables excluding religiosity are statistically significant 
with a significance level of .0 percent. Since almost all of the independent variables were 
statistically significant, they are all possible reasons why support decreased from 2006 to 
2012.  
 There are many other variables not examined here that could contribute to a 
decrease in support for peace with Israel. One of the most glaring impacts not examined 
are current events. Any physical confrontation with IDF soldiers at checkpoints in the 
West Bank would have a strong influence on the public opinion at any given time. The 
surveys used in this paper from the PCPSR were generally conducted after a major event, 
whether an election or IDF and Palestinian confrontation. In a sense, the impacts of 
current events are taken into consideration, but it is not the primary variable being 
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examined. Another influencer that can be examined in later research is whether or not 
Palestinians believe that an end to the conflict could actually occur, which would most 
likely have an impact on a respondent’s support for the peace process.  
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Appendix  
Question Wording for Dependent Variable: 
Arab Barometer Wave I: 
Q610- Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the problem 
of Israel and Palestine? 1 = The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a 
Jewish state in the Middle East only when the only when the Palestinians accept Israel’s 
existence/2 = The Arab world should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state 
in the Middle East/97 = Not clear 
 
AB Wave II: 
Q709- Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion with regard to the 
Palestinian question? 1. The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish 
state in the Middle East only when the Palestinians accept it/2. The Arab world should 
not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East/8. I don’t know/9. 
Declined to answer  
 
AB Wave III: 
Q709- Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion with regard to the 
Palestinian question? 0. Missing  /1. The Arab world should accept the existence of 
Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East only when the Palestinians accept it/2. The 
Arab world should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle 
East/8. I don’t know/9. Declined to answer. 
PCPSR: 
Q04) Generally, do you see yourself as:1 Supportive of the peace process/2 Opposed to 
the peace process/3 Between support and opposition/4 DK/NA  
 
Question Wording for Independent Variables  
 
AB Wave I: 
Q102) What do you think will be the state of [respondent’s country’s] economic 
condition a few years (3-5 years) from now? 1 = Much better/2 = A little better/3 = About 
the same/4 = A little worse/5 = Much worse  
Q702) Sex 1=Male/2=Female  
Q714a)- In general, would you describe yourself as: 1 = Religious/2 = In between/3 = 
Not religious/4 = Other/97 = Not clear/98 = Can’t Choose/Don’t know/99 = Decline to 
Answer 
AB Wave II: 
A1) 7001=West Bank/7002=Gaza  
Q101) How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? 1=Very 
good/  2=Good  /3=Bad/  4=Very Bad Q609)- Generally speaking, would you describe 
yourself as …? 1. Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not religious/9. Declined to 
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answer. 
P713- If new elections took place today with the endorsement of all political actors, and 
the same lists that ran in the legislative elections of January 25
th
, 2006 ran today as well, 
which list would you vote for? =[7001].  Alternative[=7002].  independent 
Palestine[=7003].  abu ali Mustafa[=7004].  abu al abbas[=7005].  freedom and social 
justice (hamas)[=7006].  change and reform[=7007].  national coalition for justice and 
democracy[=7008].  third way (headed by salam Fayyad)[=7009].  freedom and 
independence[=7010].  Fateh[=7011].  none of the above/ don't know /not applicable / do 
not remember/7012.  i did not participate in elections/99996. i don’t know.99999. 
declined to answer 
Q1002 Gender:1=Male/2=Female  
 
AB Wave III: 
A1) 7001=West Bank/7002=Gaza 
Q101) How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? 1=Very 
good/  2=Good  /3=Bad/  4=Very Bad 
Q503- Which of the existing parties is closest to representing your political, social and 
economic aspirations? 0=No party represents my aspirations/Name of party  
Q609)- Generally speaking, would you describe yourself as…? 0. Missing  /1. 
Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not religious/9. Declined to answer 
Q1002)- Gender 1=Male/2=Female 
PCPSR  
March 2010- Poll 35 
V03) Area 1=West Bank/2=Gaza Strip 
Q3) Generally, do you see yourself as: 1. Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not 
religious/4. DK/NA 
V08) Gender 1=Male/2=Female 
V17) Today, the poverty line in Palestine is NIS 1800 for the family. Tell us if the 
income of your family is less than or more than that. 1=Much 
less/2=less/3=same/4=more/5=much more 
Q64) Which of the following political parties do you support? 
1=PPP/2=PFLP/3=Fateh/4=Hamas/5=DFLP/6=Islamic Jihad/7=Fida/8=National 
initiative (almubadara)/9=Independent Islamist/10=Independent nationalist/11=Third 
way headed by salam fayyad/12=None of the above/13=Others  
June 2010- Poll 36 
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V03) Area 1=West Bank/2=Gaza Strip 
Q3)- Generally, do you see yourself as: 1. Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not 
religious/4. DK/NA 
V08) Gender 1=Male/2=Female 
V17) Today, the poverty line in Palestine is NIS 1800 for the family. Tell us if the 
income of your family is less than or more than that. 1=Much 
less/2=less/3=same/4=more/5=much more 
Q73) Which of the following political parties do you support? 
1=PPP/2=PFLP/3=Fateh/4=Hamas/5=DFLP/6=Islamic Jihad/7=Fida/8=National 
Initiative (Mubadara)/9=Independent Islamists/10=Independent Nationalists/11=Third 
Way, headed by Salam Fayyad/12=None of the above/13=Other, specify  
Sep 2010- Poll 37  
V03) Area 1=West Bank/2=Gaza Strip 
Q3)- Generally, do you see yourself as: 1. Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not 
religious/4. DK/NA 
V08) Gender 1=Male/2=Female 
V17) Today, the poverty line in Palestine is NIS 1800 for the family. Tell us if the 
income of your family is less than or more than that. 1=Much 
less/2=less/3=same/4=more/5=much more 
Q56) Which of the following political parties do you support? 
1=PPP/2=PFLP/3=Fateh/4=Hamas/5=DFLP/6=Islamic Jihad/7=Fida/8=National 
Initiative (Mubadara)/9=Independent Islamists/10=Independent Nationalists/11=Third 
Way, headed by Salam Fayyad/12=None of the above/13=Other, specify  
December 2010- Poll 38 
V03) Area 1=West Bank/2=Gaza Strip 
Q3)- Generally, do you see yourself as: 1. Religious/2. Somewhat religious/3. Not 
religious/4. DK/NA 
V08) Gender 1=Male/2=Female 
V17) Today, the poverty line in Palestine is NIS 1800 for the family. Tell us if the 
income of your family is less than or more than that. 1=Much 
less/2=less/3=same/4=more/5=much more 
Q53) Which of the following political parties do you support? 
1=PPP/2=PFLP/3=Fatah/4=Hamas/5=DFLP/6=Islamic Jihad/7=Fida/8=National 
Initiative (Mubadara)/9=Independent Islamists/10=Independent Nationalists/11=Third 
Way, headed by Salam Fayyad/12=None of the above/13=Other, specify  
